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INTRODUCTION
In many airports around the world, demand to use the airport infrastructure exceeds the available
capacity, leading to congestion-related delays or infeasible slot scheduling. Outside of the US,
capacity is managed according to an administrative scheme detailed in the IATA Worldwide slot
guidelines (1). To use infrastructure at a congested airport, an airline must be assigned a slot. A
slot is a time period during which an aircraft can use the airport for landing or take-off.
A number of optimization models have been developed to solve the problem of allocating
slots to airlines. The problem was first explicitly modelled in the paper (2) which formulated
the problem as an integer linear program. More recently, fairness has been incorporated into slot
allocation models (3, 4). Fairness is a key component of a schedule which is acceptable to the
participating airlines.
Another key component in constructing a schedule which is acceptable to airlines is the
incorporation of airline’s preferences as to which flights are displaced from their preferred slots.
Although this has been addressed in the context of air traffic flow management (5, 6), as far as we
are aware, no work has been done in this direction for the slot allocation problem.
The aim of the present work is to propose a mechanism for allocating slots which is both
fair and takes into account airlines’ preferences. The scheme consists of first constructing a fair




The overall scheme we propose is a two-stage approach. In this first stage, we construct a baseline
which is fair in the sense that airlines are assigned total displacement costs in proportion to their
contribution to congestion. In order to achieve this, we develop a new measure of fairness, and
calculate the efficient frontier between the total schedule displacement and the level of fairness. A
fair baseline schedule is then selected from this efficient frontier.
In the second stage, the airlines suggest improvements to the baseline schedule. In par-
ticular, for each of its requests, the airline indicates how much schedule displacement it would be
willing to accept subject to its total preferred schedule displacements being at least equal to its total
assigned schedule displacement in the baseline schedule. The proposed mechanism then attempts
to meet as many requests for improvement as possible. The total schedule displacement assigned
to the airline is referred to its budget and hence we call this the budget displacement mechanism.
The notation required to present our new mechanism is shown in Table 1. For sake of
brevity, we do not present the full slot allocation model here, and refer the reader to (2) for further
details.
Congestion-based fairness
By congestion, we mean excess of demand for slots in a given time period with respect to the air-
port capacity constraints. Note that it does not make sense to displace requests for movements in
uncongested periods. However, using the previous fairness approaches based on assigning sched-
ule displacement to airlines in proportion to the number of movement requests, airlines with lots
of flights in off-peak periods may have their peak flights disproportionately displaced.
We therefore propose to modify the fairness index of (7) to take into account the number
of requests an airline makes during congested periods. By vdt we denote a congestion indicator
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Sets
T set of time coordination intervals in a day
A set of airlines
M (Ma) set of movement requests (by airline a)
D (Dm) set of dates in scheduling season (for which movement m is requested)
Parameters
f tm displacement cost of assigning movement request m a slot at time t
vtd indicates whether time period t is congested at time t on date d
σm schedule displacement cost assigned to movement request m in fair baseline
schedule
δm airline’s preferred schedule displacement cost for movement request m
Σa schedule displacement cost assigned to airline a in fair baseline schedule
Decisions and functions
xtm indicating whether movement request m is assigned slot at time t
ym indicates whether request for improved displacement by airline m can be sat-
isfied (in budget displacement mechanism)




m total schedule displacement cost assigned to airline a
S= ∑a∈A sa total schedule displacement
µa fairness index for airline a (see (1))
TABLE 1 Notation
which takes the value 1 if the time interval t on date d is congested, and 0 otherwise. Congestion
for a given time period does not just occur because of an excess of demand for that time interval in
particular, but also by excess demand for adjacent time intervals whose requests may be displaced
to other time periods in order to construct a feasible schedule. Hence, we construct our congestion
indicator from a schedule which is optimal with respect to total displacement. Specifically, if an
extra request for a slot would cause a capacity constraint to be broken in the optimal schedule, then
we deem the time interval of the request to be congested.












That is, µa is the proportion of schedule displacement allocated to airline a divided by the propor-
tion of movement requests made during congested periods by airline a. We refer to this denom-
inator as the contribution to congestion of an airline. Based on the principle that airlines should
be allocated schedule displacement in proportion to contribution to congestion, it is desirable that
this value should be as close as possible to 1 for all airlines. This can be ensured by adding the
following fairness objective to our slot allocation optimization model, which we refer to as the




A similar objective was proposed in (7).
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Displacement Budget Mechanism
The incorporation of displacement preferences can be achieved through the modification of the slot
allocation model of (2). These modifications depend on the following new sets of parameters:
σm = baseline displacement cost for movement m
Σa = ∑
m∈Ma
σa = total baseline displacement cost for airline a
δm = preferred displacement cost for movement m
The baseline displacement cost for a movement m is calculated with respect to a reference
schedule. The parameters δm ≥ 0 are displacement costs chosen by the operating airlines which
they would prefer a movement did not exceed. To ensure each airline is assigned a fair amount
of delay, we require the total displacement cost each airline uses to be at least equal to the total
displacement cost for the baseline schedule, that is:
∑
m∈Ma
δm ≥ Σa for a ∈A





m ≤ σm− (δm−σm)ym for m ∈M if δm < σm
where ym is a new decision variable that can be interpreted as follows:
ym =
{
1 if m assigned slot such that schedule delay is less than δm,
0 otherwise.





m ≤ δm for m ∈M if δm ≥ σm.
These constraints ensure that all requests are assigned a delay at most max{δm,σm}. The
objective of this model is then lexicographical optimize the number of satisfied the number of














We test our overall slot allocation scheme using real data for a medium-sized airport. For sim-
plicity, we solve the problem without priority classes. This problem has 898 requests. The integer
linear programs are solved using Gurobi(8).
Reference schedule and simulation of preferences
The reference schedule is found by solving the total displacement-fairness problem for congestion-
based fairness with ε = 0.9. This yields a total displacement cost of 8123, a relatively small
increase as compared to the minimum total displacement cost of 8003 found by solving the problem
without fairness constraints. Displacement preferences for the airlines are simulated assuming each
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airline has a cost function for the displacement of each movement of the form:
ctm = rm|t− tm|
and then for each airline selecting preferred delays which minimize their displacement costs assum-
ing all requests are satisfied. The base costs rm are randomly generated from a uniform distribution
on the interval (0,1).
Results
A summary of the results from the displacement budget mechanism over all airlines and for the
airline with the largest displacement costs are given in Table 2. These show that about a fifth of
requests for improved displacements were satisfied. However, this has led to the total displacement
costs increasing by around a third. Averaged over all airlines, the additional displacement cost per
satisfied improvement request is 11946−812343 = 88.9, Similar observations also hold for the airline
with the largest displacement costs.
All airlines
Initial displacement costs 8123
Preferred displacement costs 8472
New displacement costs 11946
Number improvement requests 214
Satisfied improvement requests 43
Airline with largest displacement costs
Initial displacement costs 1463
Preferred displacement costs 1463
New displacement costs 1839
Number of improvement requests 50
Satisfied improvement requests 9
TABLE 2 Summary of prioritization results
In Figure 1 are plotted the baseline delay costs with preferred delay costs and the new
delay costs after the displacement budget mechanism. Note that all requests which had no initial
displacement and for which the airline requested no displacement have been omitted from this plot.
The plot demonstrates that when an airline allows a larger displacement cost than the baseline, this
flexibility is often not used, or only partially used. This is because the mechanism will not assign
requests a greater displacement unless it will help another request for improved displacement to be
fulfilled.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a slot allocation mechanism which incorporates efficiency, fairness,
and takes into account the airlines’ priorities. The scheme consists of first constructing a fair
reference schedule, and then using airlines preferences to make adjustments to this.
The method used to construct a fair reference schedule improves over previous schemes
by using the principle that the schedule delay an airline receives should be proportional to its
contribution to congestion rather than simply the number of requests it makes.
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FIGURE 1 Displacement costs for an airline before and after displacement budget mecha-
nism
The mechanism for taking into account the airlines’ priorities consisted of allowing the
airlines specify how the displacement costs assigned to them in the reference schedule should be
distributed among their flights, and then meeting as many prioritized requests as possible. In a
numerical experiment, we demonstrated that a significant number of these requests could be met,
but at the expense of some increase in the total schedule displacement.
Fairbrother and Zografos 7
REFERENCES
[1] International Air Transport Association, Worldwide Slot Guidelines, 2017, http:
//www.iata.org/policy/infrastructure/slots/Pages/slot-guidelines.aspx, ac-
cessed 25 April 2017.
[2] Zografos, K. G., Y. Salouras, and M. A. Madas, Dealing with the efficient allocation of
scarce resources at congested airports. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technolo-
gies, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2012, pp. 244–256.
[3] Jacquillat, A. and V. Vaze, Inter-airline equity in airport scheduling interventions, 2015, work-
ing paper.
[4] Zografos, K. and Y. Jiang, Modelling fairness in slot scheduling decisions at capacity-
constrained airports, 2017, presented at Transportation Research Board Annual Conference
2017.
[5] Pilon, N., A. Cook, S. Ruiz, A. Bujor, and L. Castelli, Improved Flexibility and Equity for
Airspace Users During Demand-capacity Imbalance. In 6th SESAR Innovation Days, 2016.
[6] Bertsimas, D. and S. Gupta, Fairness and collaboration in network air traffic flow management:
an optimization approach. Transportation Science, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2015, pp. 57–76.
[7] Zografos, K. and Y. Jiang, Modelling and solving the airport slot scheduling problem with
efficiency, fairness, and accessibility considerations. In TRISTAN Symposium, 2016.
[8] Gurobi Optimization, I., Gurobi Optimizer Reference Manual, 2017.
